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Deception is an essentially social act, yet little is known about how social consequences
affect the decision to deceive. In this study, participants played a computerized game of
deception without constraints on whether or when to attempt to deceive their opponent.
Participants were questioned by an opponent outside the scanner about their knowledge
of the content of a display. Importantly, questions were posed so that, in some conditions,
it was possible to be deceptive, while in other conditions it was not. To simulate a realis-
tic interaction, participants could be confronted about their claims by the opponent. This
design, therefore, creates a context in which a deceptive participant runs the risk of being
punished if their deception is detected. Our results show that participants were slower
to give honest than to give deceptive responses when they knew more about the display
and could use this knowledge for their own beneﬁt. The condition in which confrontation
was not possible was associated with increased activity in subgenual anterior cingulate
cortex. The processing of a question which allows a deceptive response was associated
with activation in right caudate and inferior frontal gyrus. Our ﬁndings suggest the decision
to deceive is affected by the potential risk of social confrontation rather than the claim
itself.
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INTRODUCTION
Deception has been of interest to psychologists, forensic experts,
and laymen (Woodruff and Premack, 1979; Whiten and Byrne,
1988; Saarni and Lewis, 1993; Bradley et al., 1996; Walters, 2000).
It has triggered trans-disciplinary scientiﬁc investigations within
anthropology; philosophy; cognitive, social, and forensic psychol-
ogy; and recently, cognitive neuroscience. Among the reasons
for studying deception, determining the motivation for decep-
tive behavior, and enhancing recognition of deceptive strategies
appear to be of core interest. For deception to be successful, it
needs to have some foundation in truth, such that people tend not
to deceive with a cluster of deceptive messages, but instead incor-
porate deception while telling the truth (see e.g., Ekman, 1992;
DePaulo et al., 1996; DePaulo and Kashy, 1998). Therefore, decep-
tion may be interwoven into a partially honest message, to secure
the trust of interlocutors.
Complex social interaction typically requires the ability to
make rapid decisions that take account of possible outcomes. This
involves a broad set of cognitive processes, including the ability
(i) to determine the possible courses of action and to identify how
they could be coordinated with the interlocutor, (ii) to weigh these
available courses of action against one another, and (iii) to choose
which action to perform next in the interaction.
Deception is an example of a complex social interaction and
thus involves the same set of cognitive processes (Sip et al., 2008)
but has the goal to instill a false belief in the mind of the interlocu-
tor so as to manipulate how the interaction unfolds. To deceive,
therefore, consciously and/or subconsciouslywemust be able (i) to
determine whether deception is one of the set of possible actions
in the interaction, (ii) to weigh the advantage to be gained by
deceiving against the risks and consequences of being detected,
and (iii) to choose to perform the deceptive action. As argued by
Sip et al. (2008) these key cognitive components of social decision-
making, andnot the telling of a falsehood as such,provide themain
explanatory content for the neural activity associatedwith the pro-
duction of deception. Here, we aim to explore decision-making
in deception in terms of the costs and values of our day-by-day
contexts, while providing a free choice within the limitations of
decision-making in laboratory settings.
In deceptive encounters, the change in circumstances is con-
nected not only to the decision per se, but also to the impact
resulting from an attempt tomodulate the perspectives and beliefs
of others. Therefore, like all choices – especially in social inter-
actions – deception is inﬂuenced by probable gains and losses.
Usually, we choose to deceive because we believe that if our decep-
tion is successful,we shall be better off than if we had told the truth.
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There aremany variables to consider inmaking such a choice.Will
our deception be detected? What are the consequences of detec-
tion? Will we gain something if we are falsely accused of telling a
falsehood (see Sip et al., 2010)? Deception is not just a simple mat-
ter of truth and falsehood. The gains from deception can be large,
but the actual calculation of relative gains and losses involves solv-
ing a complicated decision-making tree, which can, at best, only
be approximated. In real-life, the cost of being caught red-handed
can be enormous, in terms of loss of reputation, trust, power, or
money. Consequently, the danger of being confronted with one’s
deceptive claims may share similarities with experiencing negative
social consequences, such as rejection (Masten et al., 2009; Onoda
et al., 2009).
There has been a signiﬁcant lack of imaging literature that treats
deception as a social phenomenon. Only recently, neuroimaging
investigations started treating deception within a framework of
social decision-making (see e.g., Abe et al., 2007; Barrios et al.,
2008; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Greene and Paxton, 2009; Bhatt
et al., 2010;Carrion et al., 2010; Sip et al., 2010).Abe and colleagues
addressed the issue of instructed lies by introducing a clever twist
in their instructions to participants (Abe et al., 2007). Using a
temporary absence of experimenter 1, experimenter 2 secretly
instructed participants to deceive experimenter 1 by providing
opposite responses than those suggested by the experimenter 1.
Interestingly, in this study, participants faced an externally intro-
duced change to the set of rules, and therefore it might be prob-
lematic to account for that change as a result of both peripheral
attentional load and deception activation that could have con-
tributed to the ﬁnal results. Bhatt et al. (2010) investigated the role
of social image in strategic deception to manipulate others’ beliefs
about each other for gains in a bargaining game. Another study
tested how participants would behave when faced with a possibil-
ity of being deceptive to gain monetary rewards (dishonest gain;
Greene and Paxton, 2009).
Many earlier studies (see e.g., Ganis et al., 2003; Spence et al.,
2004; Langleben et al., 2005) have tested the production of decep-
tion by instructing participants when to tell a falsehood. In this
way, the truth or falsity of participants’ claims have been treated
as an independent variable in most experimental paradigms, such
that in most experiments, whether a claim is true or false has
been under the control of the experimenter and not the partic-
ipant. This approach excludes social decision-making from the
experimental equation (see Sip et al., 2008 and also Greely and
Illes, 2007). Therefore, the purpose of the present study is to take
an alternative approach that focuses more on the social decision-
making processes involved in deception, rather than on deception
as a “yes” or “no” response equated with an honest or deceptive
response respectively.Wewere primarily interested in investigating
how participants produced deception given a free choice to make
deceptive claimswhendetectionwas a possible social consequence.
Therefore, rather than treating deception as an independent vari-
able coded in a balanced factorial design, we instead controlled
the social context for deception by systematically varying both the
possibility to deceive and the possibility of being detected. Then,
within this context, we left participants free to decide when and if
they should attempt to make deceptive claims.We thus treated the
responses associated with the decision to deceive as a modulatory
variable.
A novel design was implemented in an attempt to accommo-
date for free choice and potential confrontation. In a paradigm
modiﬁed from a behavioral study of Keysar et al. (2000), partic-
ipants were questioned by an interlocutor about their knowledge
of the content of a display, and the interlocutor could some-
times challenge their responses. Rather than being instructed to
deceive the interlocutor, questions were posed to participants so
that deception was meaningful in some conditions and not in
others, and so that any acts of deception could be detected in
some conditions and not in others. Within this design, partici-
pants were left to choose for themselves when to deceive, and with
that choice followed the possible consequence of being caught
out in a lie. This allowed us to treat deception as an outcome of a
social decision-making process, and, in our data analysis, to regress
the decision to deceive with neural and behavioral measures.
Given that deception is a social decision-making process, and
that the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is involved in decision-
making (see e.g., Botvinick, 2007; Dolan, 2007; Rushworth and
Behrens, 2008; Croxson et al., 2009), we expected ACC to be
active in conditions where it was necessary to balance a mon-
etary reward for successfully deceiving the interlocutor against
the risk of detection (e.g., Abe et al., 2006; Baumgartner et al.,
2009).
Participants played both against (what they believed were) a
human and a computer. This double partnershipwasmotivated by
previous social studies that showed that participants care whether
their opponent is a human and attribute different behavior accord-
ingly (see e.g., Gallagher et al., 2002). This aspect has not yet been
tested in deception paradigms.
It bears clarifying that the primary aim of our study was not
to observe how behavior and neural activity of individuals were
affected by the performance of deception per se. Rather, the pri-
mary aim of our study was to investigate how individuals’ decision
to deceive modulates their behavior and neural activity given the
social and informational context in which that decision is made.
Our focus was therefore not on the production of deception as
an act in and of itself, but rather on the social decision-making
processes associated with the production of deception. This is why
the participants’ decision to deceive was treated as a free modula-
tory parameter in this study, and not as part of the study’s factorial
design. In this way, our study breaks with standard practice in the
design of deception experiments for the purpose of addressing an
important unresolved issue.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
Sixteen healthy, right-handed participants with no reported neu-
rological or psychiatric disorders responded to an ad to volunteer
in the experiment. Data from two participants were excluded.
One told a falsehood at all times regardless of the context, while
there were excessive movement artifacts in the fMRI data for the
other. The remaining 14 participants (7 males) were aged between
20 and 45 years (mean= 26; SD= 6.9). Participants gave written
informed consent to take part in the study, conducted according to
the principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki, which was
approved by the Joint Ethics Committee of the National Hospital
for Neurology and Neuroscience (UCL NHS Trust) and Institute
of Neurology (UCL).
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STIMULI
Participants were presented with a two-dimensional representa-
tion of a three-dimensional box. The box was divided into 16
compartments (4× 4 grid) or shelves (Figure 1). On each trial,
each compartment could be empty or contain one of seven differ-
ent objects. Each compartment was always represented as open to
the front, but could be either open or closed to the back. From the
front view, it was obvious if a particular object could also be seen
from the back.
PROCEDURE
While in the scanner, participants were shown the front view of the
stimulus, and were told an interlocutor was simultaneously being
shown the back view. On each trial (see Figure 2), the interlocutor
asked participants if they could see a target object on any of the
shelves. The target object was randomized across trials. There was
no restriction on whether the response should be true or false.
Participants heard the questions via headphones and responded
yes or no by button press.
The opponent could ask three types of question (A, B, and
C). For Question type A, the target object was visible from the
front and the back views, so that it was obvious to the participant
that the interlocutor could easily detect deception (symmetrical
knowledge; truth_eliciting question). For Question type B, the tar-
get object was only visible from the front view, so that it was
obvious to the participant that it should be more difﬁcult for the
interlocutor to detect deception (asymmetrical knowledge, decep-
tion by omission; falsehood_eliciting question). For Question type
C, the target object was not present in the box, so that it was
more difﬁcult for the interlocutor to detect deception, but this was
not immediately obvious to the participant because it required
visual search (asymmetrical knowledge, deception by commission;
falsehood_eliciting question).
The experiment consisted of two sessions with different types
of interlocutor (humanor computer). Each session consisted of six
blocks. In two blocks participants were informed that a computer
FIGURE 1 | An example of the stimulus display.The display represented
the 16 compartment box with a typical set of objects used in the study. The
participants were asked several different types of questions regarding the
contents of the box, e.g., Question type A “Do you see a roller-skate?”
(Truth_eliciting question), Question type B “Do you see a doll?”
(Falsehood_eliciting question), Question type C “Do you see a giraffe?”
(Falsehood_eliciting question).
program posed the questions and a computer-generated voice
was used. In another two blocks participants were informed that
the questions were posed online by the experimenter (K. Sip),
whose voice they had heard, and with whom the participants had
interacted with prior to the functional scans. In the two remain-
ing blocks, participants were instructed to always state whether
an object was present (answer truthfully with no motivation to
deceive). These blocks were only used to check whether partici-
pants understood the task, and they were not used in the fMRI
analysis. Unknown to the participants, the experimenter’s voice
was pre-recorded and the questionswere posed in a predetermined
order.
In each of these situations, the interlocutor could confront par-
ticipants about their responses in one block but not in the other.
Although participants always knew which block they were in, they
did not know which responses would be confronted. They were
informed prior to the start of the confrontation block that the
interlocutor was allowed to confront only some of their responses,
usually up to four responses per block.
Each experimental trial could be rewarded or punished with a
small amount (50 pence per event). Participants were informed
that they would be rewarded for successful deception and penal-
ized for unsuccessful attempts across all conditions. There was
no monetary consequence for telling the truth when the object
was visible for both players. The system of rewards was intro-
duced to further motivate participants to try to avoid detection.
Importantly, no monetary feedback was given to the participants
during the functional scans at any point. Therefore, participants
were not able to track their rewards on a trial to trial basis, instead
allowing them to give priority to the decision about whether to
be honest or not. This was important to ensure that participants
were attentive in all conditions and refrained from giving only one
type of response, e.g., always replying “yes” when confrontation
was not possible. The total rewards were calculated at the end of
experiment.
The same reward pattern was used for unchecked trials in
the confrontation blocks. However, in the few predetermined
checked trials (four per block), participants were penalized if they
were caught telling a falsehood, and were compensated for being
wrongly accused of telling a falsehood when they made a truthful
response.
Question trials were randomized within the blocks. Block
and session order were counterbalanced using a 2× 2 Latin
Square. After the experiment was completed, the participants were
debriefed,which revealed that all believed they had interactedwith
a human during the human sessions, and that all had actively tried
to deceive her.
ANALYSIS AND DESIGN
A three-way factorial design was used with question type
(3)× confrontation (2)× interlocutor (2) as factors, with
response type included as a covariate and response time as a depen-
dent variable. In data analysis, participants’ decision to answer
truthfully or to try to deceive the interlocutor was added as a
modulator [as a covariate for the response times and a parametric
modulation for the blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD)
signal]. This allowed us to determine the inﬂuence of participants’
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FIGURE 2 | An example of the events per trial in a
confrontation block.This ﬁgure presents the sequence and
duration of events in a trial in blocks where the participants could
be confronted with their claims. Participants responded on
average 2.2±0.23 s after the question was asked and the
response cue was removed from the screen. In trials where verbal
feedback was given to the participants after confronting their
choices, the feedback lasted 1.7±0.27 s.
active social decision-making on their behavior and neural activity
when performing deception.
The approach to include participants’ decision to deceive as a
modulatory variable deviates from the usual approaches of treat-
ing variables of interest as controlled experimental factors to be
analyzed with analysis of variance. However, our choice is justi-
ﬁed, both in principle and empirically, from the perspective of our
experimental design. The truth or falsity of participants’ responses
were not experimentally controlled, but intentionally left under
participant control, so that the choice to deceive was not an inde-
pendent variable in our study. In principle, therefore, the choice
to deceive is not a valid target for inclusion as a separate fac-
tor in our analysis. Moreover, because participants were free to
decide when they should make deceptive claims, they attempted
to deceive more often in some conditions than in others. Empiri-
cally, therefore, participants’ decision to deceive is not sufﬁciently
balanced across conditions, so that treating this variable as a factor
would violate one of the core assumptions of analysis of vari-
ance. It should also be recalled in this context that our reason for
designing the study in this way was that we were not interested
in deception in itself as an isolated speech act, but in the social
decision-making processes involved in deception. Participants’
free decision to deceive was thus conceived in our experimental
design as a modulatory variable, and is analyzed as such.
fMRI SCANNING PARAMETERS
A 1.5T Siemens Sonata MRI scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Ger-
many) was used to acquire T1-weighted anatomical images
and T2∗-weighted echo-planar functional images with blood
oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) contrast (35 axial slices,
2mm slice thickness with 1mmgap, 3× 3 resolution in plane, slice
TE= 50ms, volume TR= 3.15 s, 64× 64 matrix, 192× 192mm
FOV, 90˚ ﬂip angle). Two functional EPI sessions of up to 345 on
average whole brain volumes (range 300–364 depending on par-
ticipants response speed) were acquired and the ﬁrst four volumes
were discarded to allow for T1 equilibrium effects.
Image processing was carried out using SPM5 (Statistical Para-
metric Mapping software,Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimag-
ing,UCL)1 implemented inMATLAB (TheMathworks Inc.,Mass-
achusetts)2. EPI images were realigned and unwarped to correct
for movements, slice time corrected, spatially normalized to stan-
dard space using theMontreal Neurological Institute EPI template
(voxel size of 2mm× 2mm× 2mm) and spatially smoothed with
a 8mm full-width half maximum Gaussian kernel.
IMAGING DATA ANALYSIS
All events were modeled using the standard hemodynamic
response function of SPM5. The design matrix comprised a col-
umn for each experimental condition,with separate events deﬁned
by their onset time and duration (based on participants’ response
times). In keeping with our statistical approach of treating the
participants’ decision to deceive as a modulatory variable, partic-
ipants’ truthful, and deceptive responses in each condition were
1www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm
2www.mathworks.com
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added as separate parametric modulations of each column of the
design matrix. The ﬁt to the data was estimated for each par-
ticipant using a general linear model (Friston et al., 1995) with
a 128 s high-pass ﬁlter, global scaling, and modeling of serial
autocorrelations.
Individual T-contrasts related to the different conditionswithin
our factorial design were created from the parameter estimates
(beta weights). T-contrasts were computed within subjects for the
main effect of confrontation and the main effect of partner, for
the effects of question types A, B, and C, and for the relevant inter-
actions. These were then used in separate second level random
effects analyses in order to facilitate inferences about group effects
(Friston et al., 1995).
Unless speciﬁed otherwise, whole brain results are reported for
clusters with at least 10 voxels and a threshold of p< 0.005 uncor-
rected for multiple comparisons, the most commonly reported
threshold for social neuroimaging studies (Wager et al., 2007). This
threshold allows for an appropriate balance between Type I and
Type II errors especially in complicated designs involving socio-
cognitive decision-making (see e.g., Lieberman and Cunningham,
2009). Additionally,we indicate several areas which survive amore
stringent FWE correction for multiple comparisons.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
A 2 (partner)× 2 (possibility of being confronted)× 3 (type of
question) repeated measures ANOVA revealed signiﬁcant main
effects of confrontation [F(1,13)= 16.23, p = 0.001] and question
type [F(2,26)= 61.72, p< 0.001] on producing false responses.
The main effect of partner was not signiﬁcant [F(1,13)= 1.49,
p= 0.24]. The test revealed a signiﬁcant interaction between con-
frontation and question type on the percentage of false claims
[F(2,26)= 3.65, p = 0.04] There were fewer false responses in
the confrontation condition, but this was only the case for
the falsehood_eliciting question types (see Figure 3). There
was no signiﬁcant interaction between partner and question
type [F(2,26)= 1.56, p = 0.23] and partner and confronta-
tion [F(1,13)= 0.11, p = 0.75] on producing false responses.
The three-way interaction was not signiﬁcant [F(2,26)= 0.024,
p = 0.97].
When the decision to deceive was added as a covariate, a 2 (type
of interlocutor)× 2 (possibility of being confronted by the inter-
locutor)× 3 (type of question asked) repeatedmeasuresANCOVA
on response time revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of question
type [F(2,12)= 13.26, p = 0.001], and a signiﬁcant interaction
between the question type factor and the response type covari-
ate [F(2,12)= 4.98, p = 0.03]. A marginally signiﬁcant interac-
tion between confrontation and question type [F(2,12)= 3.84,
p = 0.05] was also revealed.
Figure 4 (see Figure 4) shows that (i) when participants and
interlocutors had the same knowledge about the presence of an
object in the box, participants were faster to give a true response,
regardless of the possibility of confrontation; (ii) when there was
obviously asymmetric knowledge between participants and the
interlocutor, participants were slower to give a true response,
but only when there was no possibility of being confronted; and
(iii) when participants knew more about the stimulus but greater
FIGURE 3 | Mean percentage of false claims across conditions. For
illustration purposes, this graph shows the mean percentage of false claims
across question type and confrontation. In the confrontation condition
participants gave 58.95% (SE=5.63) false responses to QuestionType B
(the target object was only visible from the front view), 56.04% (SE=7.15)
false responses to QuestionType C (the target object was not present in
the box), and 8.3% (SE=2.76) false responses to QuestionType A (the
target object was visible from the front and the back views). In the
non-confrontation condition they gave 76.45% (SE=4.49) false responses
to QuestionType B, 72.74% (SE=7.62) false responses to QuestionType C,
and 5.6% (SE=2.61) false responses to QuestionType A.
FIGURE 4 | Mean response times (RT) to answer the opponent’s
question. Separate means are given for false and true responses, and for
responses given both when the opponent could and could not confront the
response. Error bars represent one SEM.
attention was required to take advantage of this knowledge, they
were slower to give a true than a false response, regardless of the
possibility of being confronted. These effects were not signiﬁcant,
however, if the covariate coding participants’ decision to respond
truthfully or falsely on each trial was removed from the analysis.
NEUROIMAGING RESULTS
When the decision to deceive was added as a parametric modula-
tor, the main effect of confrontation showed increased activity in
subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (subACC) when participants’
responses could not be confronted (Figure 5; see Table 1).
There was also a signiﬁcant main effect of question type. For
question type B, we observe increased activation in right caudate
and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; Figure 6). For question type A, we
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observed increased activity in right putamen, superior temporal
gyrus (auditory cortex), and occipital cortex.
DISCUSSION
The current investigation allowed participants the choice to
deceive by creating a context in which deception was sometimes
possible, but ran into the risk of being punished if it was detected.
Our paradigm captures the idea that when people attempt to
deceive others, they face a demanding task, based on balancing
the tensions between choice and potential outcomes. The par-
adigm allowed us to treat deception as the outcome of social
decision-making, and in our data analysis, to regress the choices
participants made with the neural and behavioral measures taken.
FIGURE 5 | Main effect of possibility of confrontation on response
type.The peak activation is localized in subgenual ACC (6 22 −4, p<0.023,
FEW corrected). The color-bar corresponds toT -values.
Our results suggest that social feedback can only be seen to medi-
ate responses to the question being asked if we take seriously the
variance introduced by the free choice the participants are given.
Although this is not the ﬁrst study to explore deception in social
interaction (see Baumgartner et al., 2009; Sip et al., 2010), it is one
of the ﬁrst to provide a context in which participants run the risk
of being socially confronted in case their deception is detected (see
also Baumgartner et al., 2009; Sip et al., 2010). Participants were
allowed to decide whether or not to deceive the partner on any
given trial. We found activation in subgenual ACC when the part-
ner could not check the truthfulness of the participants’ response.
Activation in right caudate and IFG was observed when partici-
pants were deciding how to respond to a question that allowed
deception. Surprisingly, there were neither behavioral nor neural
effects of partner (human vs. computer). This is surprising because
one would expect that (1) participants would consider a computer
of less importance and thus exhibit a very different pattern of
behavior in contrast to that toward human; and (2) participants
would try to attribute intentions and causality of actions to people,
but not to computers (see e.g.,Gallagher et al., 2002).We speculate
that the lack of partner effect results from the paradigm placing
the main focus on confrontation. Even though participants played
with a computer, the machine still exposes their deception to the
people observing the task outside the scanner.
The activations in right caudate and IFG strongly suggest that
when participants are in the position to make a false claim, pre-
sumably they have to decide whether or not to do so given the ratio
between the effort invested in the action and its potential rewards.
The right IFG has been typically associated with response inhi-
bition tasks in which participants typically need to inhibit their
natural response (e.g., Aron et al., 2004). Interestingly, this area
has also been implicated in risk aversion, and is suggested to play
a role in inhibition of accepting a risky option (Christopoulos
et al., 2009). Additionally, the area BA47 (see Table 1) has also
been implicated in comprehending spoken language (Petrides and
Pandya, 2002), which suggests that participants in the current
study had to focus on what they were asked about before giving a
response. The activation of caudate – well-known for processing
Table 1 | Brain regions showing activation in decision-making.
Brain region Cluster size x y z T -value Z -value
MAIN EFFECT OF CONFRONTATION (NON-CONFRONTATION>CONFRONTATION)
Right subgenual ACC (BA25)* 16 6 22 −4 9.81 5.18
MAIN EFFECT OF QUESTIONTYPE (FALSE ELICITING QUESTION>TRUTH ELICITING QUESTION)
Right superior frontal gyrus (SMA, BA 6) 26 4 6 66 7.89 4.70
Right caudate 47 14 12 10 6.56 4.29
Right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; BA 47) 36 42 20 −12 5.58 3.92
MAIN EFFECT OF QUESTIONTYPE (TRUTH ELICITING QUESTION>FALSE ELICITING QUESTION)
Right superior temporal gyrus (BA 22)* 35 48 −8 0 9.33 5.07
Right putamen* 54 22 −2 6 10.16 5.25
Left occipital lobe 44 −8 −72 5 4.93 3.54
The coordinates are given according to the MNI space, together with T-scores, Z-scores, and signiﬁcant thresholds p<0.005 uncorrected for multiple comparisons
with a cluster extent threshold of 10 voxels, corrected at the cluster level. We indicate with an asterisk (∗) the areas which survive more stringent threshold of FWE
correction of p<0.05 at the voxel level.
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A B
FIGURE 6 | Main effect of falsehood-eliciting question (QuestionType B) on response type.The peak activations are in (A) the right caudate (14 12 10) and
(B) right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; 42 20–12), p<0.005, uncorrected. The color-bar corresponds toT -values.
effort to engage in an action/choice selection (Croxson et al., 2009;
Kurniawan et al., 2010) – and dorsal putamen – reported in predic-
tion error, memory, and affective learning (Delgado, 2007) – sug-
gests that the choice of making either a false or true claimmay elicit
the feeling of reward, reward anticipation, or the feeling of control
whenmaking a choice (Leotti et al., 2010).While giving a response,
participants needed to also account for previous choices as well as
indirectly learn from the interactionwhatwould be their best strat-
egy to exercise deception. Interestingly, activation of dorsal puta-
men and caudate nucleus may indicate that memory and learning
facilitated the choice participants were faced with in our task.
Anterior cingulate cortexhas been implicated in social–affective
processes involved in decision-making (Dolan, 2007; Rushworth
and Behrens, 2008; Croxson et al., 2009). ACC is believed to
store associations between past behaviors and rewards (for reviews
see Paus, 2001; Rudebeck et al., 2008) and to process choices
in dynamic and open-ended contexts (Walton et al., 2007). It
subserves response and cognitive conﬂict monitoring (Botvinick,
2007), calculates cost–beneﬁt evaluations (Croxson et al., 2009),
reward expectations (Delgado et al., 2005; Etkin et al., 2006) as
well as action selection (for review see e.g., Rushworth et al., 2004;
Rushworth et al., 2007). The dorsal and rostral portions of ACC
have been associated with choice, conﬂict monitoring (Rushworth
et al., 2004) and representations of beliefs and expectations (Petro-
vic et al., 2005). The more ventral part of ACC has been reported
in processing the value of possible choices in relation to expected
reward (Bush et al., 2000). Because of anatomical and functional
connections with orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; for review see e.g.,
Paus, 2001) and ventral striatum (Balleine et al., 2007; Delgado,
2007), ACC functions are strongly modulated by social and emo-
tional context (Rushworth et al., 2007; Rushworth and Behrens,
2008). Multiple ACC functions are therefore likely to be impli-
cated in the decision to deceive (e.g., Ganis et al., 2003; Abe et al.,
2006; Baumgartner et al., 2009).
Our ﬁnding that ACC is active in a task involving deception is
not surprising. Surprisingly though, in other studies an increased
activation in ACC has been reported in very different portions of
this large area. Several groups reported the activation of dorsal
ACC (BA 24/32; Ganis et al., 2003; Kozel et al., 2005; Langleben
et al., 2005) in association with the production of deception. How-
ever, the tasks used in these experiments were quite different from
the task used in the present study (for discussion see Greely and
Illes, 2007; Sip et al., 2008; Christ et al., 2009), and the activations
were locatedmore dorsally. For example, Ganis et al. (2003) found
activation in the dorsal ACC (BA32, 4 6 39; among other areas)
by contrasting activity associated with the production of “spon-
taneous lies” that do not necessarily ﬁt into a coherent story with
the production of well-rehearsed falsehoods accommodated in a
prepared story. Kozel et al. (2005) observed right ACC activation
(ACC, 3 18 60) in a mock-crime experiment in which the subjects
were asked to deny possession of a “stolen” object. This activation
was associated with monitoring a deceptive response by inhibiting
truth-telling. In another study,Abe et al. (2006) observed increased
activation of right ACC (BA 24/32) when participants engaged in
deception about past events. Only recently was ACC (BA 24) acti-
vation reported in an ecologically valid study (Baumgartner et al.,
2009),where itwas associatedwith breaking a previously expressed
promise in a trust game.
Our observation that the subgenual ACC is active when the
decision to deceive does not have immediate social consequences
is, however, interesting. SubgenualACChas previously been impli-
cated in studies of social rejection (8 22−4 and 10 20−8 inMasten
et al., 2009) and social pain (10 32 −10 in Onoda et al., 2009). Our
imaging ﬁndings, supported by our behavioral results, therefore
suggest that ACC subserves social monitoring when the decision
to deceive does not depend upon possible confrontation. In the
confrontation condition, the decision to deceive or not will be
based largely on utilities, for example the value of deception, and
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the likely hood of being detected. In the non-confrontation condi-
tion these considerations are irrelevant. Rather, the decision not to
deceive, even when deception cannot be detected, would be based
on moral considerations. To our knowledge, this role of subgen-
ual ACC has not been implicated in other deception studies. Our
results conﬁrm our hypothesis (also expressed in Sip et al., 2008)
that social feedback – and consequently a potential social rejec-
tion – affects production of deception.We speculate that subACC,
caudate, and IFG play an important role in mediating a decision
to deceive based on the context, rather than in producing false
statements.
SOCIAL AND MORAL CONSIDERATION IN EXERCISING DECEPTION
For many of us, social rejection may also be based onmoral values
(Greene et al., 2001; Raine andYang, 2006) and expectations. Thus
deception is interestingly related to moral emotions, such as guilt
and shame. However, a moral belief that we should not deceive
others may be dismissed in contexts in which deception is allowed
or even expected, as inmost game scenarios and controlled experi-
mental settings (Sip et al., 2010). This means that although there is
an important relationship between deception and morality, when
deception is sanctioned by the context, it is possible for people to
perform genuine deception without experiencing any of themoral
emotions one might expect to experience otherwise. Nevertheless,
other social consequences of being detected must still be weighted
accordingly when one is faced with the choice to deceive, even
when moral concerns are made irrelevant to the decision.
We did not observe activation in an emotional network (e.g.,
insula or amygdala) as in another ecological study of decep-
tion (Baumgartner et al., 2009). The reason for this difference
may be a difference in focus. Our participants did not declare
(promise) to their interlocutor whether they would be honest or
deceptive on speciﬁc trials. Therefore, the component of explicit
social commitment is not involved in our study, such that we
should not expect a similar emotional reaction as observed in
Baumgartner’s study (Baumgartner et al., 2009). This might be
because the choice of whether to perform a morally sanctioned
act of deception in a game and the more morally loaded choice
of whether to break a promise, involve different social phenom-
ena – rejection (van Beest and Williams, 2006) and guilt respec-
tively. Nevertheless, it is challenging to evoke and accurately assess
guilt associated with deception in real-life interrogations (Bashore
and Rapp, 1993; Pollina et al., 2004), let alone in experimental
settings.
Additionally, given that most neuroimaging studies of decep-
tion use a researcher as a recipient of deception (and this is known
to the subjects), onemay argue that this couldweaken participants’
attempts at deception. In our experiment, however, participants
do not act against the experimenter, but rather act within the nor-
mative context of the experiment, which implies that the same
behavior would not be processed differently toward a stranger. In
other words, if participants believe they play with another human
in the context of this experiment, this entails an oppositional
behavior. Therefore, moral emotions are canceled out by the fact
that immoral behavior is sanctioned by the context. Additionally,
based on the post-scan debrieﬁng, we are conﬁdent that partici-
pants tried their best to deceive the experimenter, where in many
cases this was a matter of gaining an upper hand over somebody
more experienced in the topic.
THE ROLE OF INSTRUCTIONS
In experimental settings, instructions given to the participants not
only determine their behavior,but also framehow they think about
others’ actions, mental states, and expectations. In complicated
studies of social decision-making, there is a discrepancy between
what the instructions say, what the participants agree to do, and
what they actually do while lying still in the MR chamber. This is
speciﬁcally relevant to experimental tasks based on explicit forced-
choice instructions, in which the execution of deception is often
presumed to be intelligible independently of the choice and inten-
tion to instill a false belief in another person (Sip et al., 2008).
These social cognitive processes, functioning in the context of the
instructions, constrain the concrete task of executing deception,
thus posing conceptual problems for interpreting results produced
by any experimental design that does not incorporate them. Ide-
ally, then, task instructions (1) must not deﬁne too speciﬁcally for
the participants when to be deceptive or truthful, and (2) they
should not overly limit the quantity and the quality of the choices
made by the participants.
In human behavioral and psychological experimentsmore gen-
erally, the interaction between the experimenter and the partici-
pant involves sharing a speciﬁc script that is aimed to facilitate the
execution of an experimental task (Roepstorff and Frith, 2004).
In order words, the experimenter communicates the nature of the
paradigm to the participant, who acts according to the instruc-
tions, or more precisely, to her own understanding of what they
entail. In the ideal situation, it is then up to the subject tomake the
choice of whether or not to comply. However, if the instructions
tell the participants to “lie” about events in one condition and to
be honest about other events in another (Sip et al., 2008), then
the executive role of the participant in choosing to act is essen-
tially left out. Thus, an interesting aspect of deception, namely the
social cognitive processes involved in the decision to deceive, are
excluded unless participants are able to achieve a certain degree
of freedom in response selection, which is not controlled by the
experimenter.
Interestingly, in the current study, even though experimental
instructions implicitly suggested telling a falsehood, participants
did not tell a falsehood 100% of the time when deception was pos-
sible (Figure 3). This suggests that even when there was no direct
danger of being caught in a lie in the non-confrontation condi-
tion, participants still mimic a real-life situation in this context, in
which the ratio of true and false claims is not predetermined across
contexts. Another interesting result was that there were several tri-
als in which participants decided to tell a falsehood in response to
questions in which the object was visible to both parties (Figures 3
and 4). Peculiar as it sounds; this suggests that mistakes aside, par-
ticipants did exercise their free choice, even in a situation that
was not beneﬁcial to them. Additionally, Figure 4 shows an inter-
esting pattern of reaction times relative to the question type and
response type. One possibility is that the slower RTs of true claims
are concerned with less plausible responses that perhaps require
more thought. For example, the somewhat irrational responses of
telling a falsehood in response to question type A, and telling the
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truth when deception cannot be detected in question type B, are
similarly slowed.
LIMITATIONS
Because of our effort to account for a natural deceptive interac-
tion in laboratory settings, this study faces certain limitations: (a)
free choice in deceptive decision-making give rise to a range of
behavior that is difﬁcult to predict prior to the experiment, (b)
unbalanced numbers of events that are then included in imag-
ing analysis, (c) interpersonal differences that cause inter- and
intra-subject variability in recorded data. Additionally, our study
might be underpowered due to the small sample size to detect
activations associated with moral emotions. Therefore, one may
speculate alternative explanations for the lack of moral and emo-
tional networks, such that it is plausible that the presence of moral
emotions was merely diminished instead of canceled out. Further
ecological studies are called for to allow better understanding of
neural and behavioral processes that facilitate deceptive behavior.
Overall, our ﬁndings suggest that production of deception
depends upon an effort-based affective–motivational network
rather than merely higher-level cognitive processes as has been
suggested thus far. Given that potential social consequences affect
decisions to deceive,we argue that real-life deceptionmay be inter-
preted as a decision with costs, beneﬁts and losses. The gain from
the deception must be evaluated as greater than the cost of the
deception. Similarly, the gainmade possible by the deceptionmust
be balanced against the cost of being found out. As in all such deci-
sions, the costs are monitored according to what the other person
knows and does not know, in relation to what the deceptive agents
know. We suggest that the ﬁelds of neuroeconomics and decep-
tion intersect (see e.g., Baumgartner et al., 2009) and could offer
an interesting contribution to further understanding of deception.
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